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Abstract— This work is motivated by recent results of Csisza´r
and Narayan (IEEE Trans. on Inform. Theory, Dec. 2004), which
highlight innate connections between secrecy generation by
multiple terminals and multiterminal Slepian-Wolf near-lossless
data compression (sans secrecy restrictions). We propose a new
approach for constructing secret and private keys based on the
long-known Slepian-Wolf code for sources connected by a virtual
additive noise channel, due to Wyner (IEEE Trans. on Inform.
Theory, Jan. 1974). Explicit procedures for such constructions,
and their substantiation, are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation by multiple termi-
nals, based on their observations of distinct correlated signals
followed by public communication among themselves, has
been investigated by several authors ([9], [1], among others).
It has been shown that these terminals can generate com-
mon randomness which is kept secret from an eavesdropper
privy to the public interterminal communication. Of particular
relevance to us are recent results in [5] for models with
an arbitrary number of terminals, each of which observes a
distinct component of a discrete memoryless multiple source
(DMMS). Unrestricted public communication is allowed be-
tween these terminals. All the transmissions are observed
by all the terminals and by the eavesdropper. Two models
considered in [5] are directly relevant to our work, and these
are first briefly described below.
(i) Suppose that d ≥ 2 terminals observe n i.i.d. repeti-
tions of the random variables (rvs) X1, · · ·Xd, denoted by
X1, · · · ,Xd, respectively. A secret key (SK) generated by
these terminals consists of “common randomness,” based on
public interterminal communication, which is concealed from
an eavesdropper with access to this communication. The
largest (entropy) rate of such a SK is termed the SK-capacity,
denoted by CSK , and is shown in [5] to equal
CSK = H(X1, · · · , Xd)−Rmin, (1)
where
Rmin = min
(R1,···,Rd)∈R
d∑
i=1
Ri,
with
R = {(R1, · · · , Rd) :
∑
i∈B
Ri ≥
H({Xj, j ∈ B}|{Xj, j ∈ B
c}), B ⊂ {1, · · · , d}},
where Bc = {1, · · · , d}\B.
(ii) For a given subset A ⊂ {1, · · · , d}, a private key (PK)
for the terminals in A, private from the terminals in Ac, is a
SK generated by the terminals in A (with the possible help of
the terminals in Ac), which is concealed from an eavesdropper
with access to the public interterminal communication and also
from the “helper” terminals in Ac (and, hence, private). The
largest (entropy) rate of such a PK is termed the PK-capacity,
denoted by CPK(A). It is shown in [5] that
CPK(A) = H({Xi, i ∈ A}|{Xi, i ∈ A
c})−Rmin(A), (2)
where
Rmin(A) = min
{Ri,i∈A}∈R(A)
∑
i∈A
Ri,
with
R(A) = {{Ri, i ∈ A} :
∑
i∈B
Ri ≥
H({Xj, j ∈ B}|{Xj, j ∈ B
c}), B ⊂ A}.
The results above afford the following interpretation. The
SK-capacity CSK , i.e., largest rate at which all the d terminals
can generate a SK, is obtained by subtracting from the maxi-
mum rate of shared common randomness achievable by these
terminals, viz. H(X1, · · · , Xd), the smallest sum-rate Rmin
of the data-compressed interterminal communication which
enables each of the terminals to acquire this maximal common
randomness. A similar interpretation holds for the PK-capacity
CPK(A) as well, with the difference that the terminals in Ac,
which act as helpers but must not be privy to the secrecy
generated, can simply “reveal” their observations. Hence, the
entropy terms in (1) are now replaced in (2) with additional
conditioning on {Xi, i ∈ Ac}. It should be noted that Rmin
and Rmin(A) are obtained as solutions to Slepian-Wolf (SW)
multiterminal near-lossless data compression problems not
involving any secrecy constraints. This characterization of the
SK-capacity and PK-capacity in terms of the decompositions
above also mirrors the consecutive stages in the random coding
arguments used in establishing these results. For instance,
and loosely speaking, to generate a SK, the d terminals first
generate common randomness (without any secrecy restric-
tions), say a rv L of entropy rate 1
n
H(L) > 0, through SW-
compressed interterminal communication F. This means that
all the d terminals acquire the rv L with probability ∼= 1. The
next step entails an extraction from L of a SK K = g(L) of
entropy rate 1
n
H(L|F), by means of a suitable operation per-
formed identically at each terminal on the acquired common
randomness L. When the common randomness first acquired
by the d terminals is maximal, i.e., L = (X1, · · · ,Xd) with
probability ∼= 1, then the corresponding SK K = g(L) has
the best rate CSK given by (1). A similar approach is used to
generate a PK of rate given by (2).
The discussion above suggests that techniques for multiter-
minal SW data compression could be used for the construction
of SKs and PKs. Next, in SW coding, the existence of linear
data compression codes with rates arbitrarily close to the SW
bound has been long known [3]. In particular, when the i.i.d.
sequences observed at the terminals are related to each other
through virtual communication channels characterized by in-
dependent additive noises, such linear data compression codes
can be obtained in terms of the cosets of linear error-correction
codes for these virtual channels, a fact first illustrated in [13]
for the special case of d = 2 terminals connected by a virtual
binary symmetric channel (BSC). This fact, exploited by most
known linear constructions of SW codes (cf. e.g. [2], [7], [8],
[11]), can enable us to translate these constructions and other
significant recent developments in capacity-achieving linear
codes into new SK and PK constructions. (See also recent
independent work [10] for related existence results, as also
[12].)
Motivated by these considerations, we seek to devise new
constructive schemes for secrecy generation. The main tech-
nical contribution of this work is the following: we consider
four simple models of secrecy generation and show how a
new class of secret and private keys can be constructed, based
on the SW data compression code from [13]. While we do
not specify exactly the linear capacity-achieving channel codes
used in the SW step of the procedure, these can be chosen –
for instance – from the class of LDPC [8] and turbo codes [7]
that have attracted wide attention.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a DMMS with d ≥ 2 components, with corre-
sponding generic rvs X1, · · · , Xd taking values in finite al-
phabets X1, · · · ,Xd, respectively. Let Xi = (Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n),
i ∈M = {1, · · · , d}, be n i.i.d. repetitions of rv Xi. Terminals
1, · · · , d, with respective observations X1, · · · ,Xd, represent
the d users who wish to generate a SK by public commu-
nication. These terminals can communicate with each other
through broadcasts over a noiseless public channel, possibly
interactively in many rounds. In general, a transmission from
a terminal is allowed to be any function of its observations,
and of all previous transmissions. Let F denote collectively
all the public transmissions.
Given ε > 0, the rv KS represents an ε-secret key (ε-SK)
for the terminals in M, achieved with communication F, if
there exist rvs Ki = Ki(Xi,F), i ∈ M, with Ki and KS
taking values in the same finite set KS such that KS satisfies
• the common randomness condition
Pr(Ki = KS , i ∈M) ≥ 1− ε;
• the secrecy condition
1
n
I(KS ∧ F) ≤ ε;
• the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KS) ≥
1
n
log |KS | − ε.
Let A ⊂ M be an arbitrary subset of terminals. The rv
KP(A) represents an ε-private key (ε-PK) for the terminals
in A, private from the terminals in Ac = M\A, achieved
with communication F, if there exist rvs Ki = Ki(Xi,F),
i ∈ A, with Ki and KP(A) taking values in the same finite
set KP(A) such that KP(A) satisfies
• the common randomness condition
Pr(Ki = KP(A), i ∈ A) ≥ 1− ε;
• the secrecy condition
1
n
I (KP(A) ∧ {Xi, i ∈ A
c},F) ≤ ε;
• the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KP(A)) ≥
1
n
log |KP(A)| − ε.
Definition 1 [5]: A nonnegative number R is called an
achievable SK rate if an εn-SK K(n)S is achievable with
suitable communication (with the number of rounds possibly
depending on n), such that εn → 0 and 1nH
(
K
(n)
S
)
→ R.
The largest achievable SK rate is called the SK-capacity,
denoted by CSK . The PK-capacity for the terminals in A,
denoted by CPK(A), is similarly defined. An achievable SK
rate (resp. PK rate) will be called strongly achievable if
εn above can be taken to vanish exponentially in n. The
corresponding capacities are termed strong capacities.
Single-letter characterizations have been provided for CSK
in the case of d = 2 terminals in [9], [1] and for d ≥ 2
in [5]; and for CPK(A) in case of d = 3 in [1] and
for d ≥ 3 in [5]. The proofs of the achievability parts
exploit the close connection between secrecy generation and
SW data compression. For instance, “common randomness,”
without any secrecy restrictions, is first generated through SW-
compressed interterminal communication. This means that all
the d terminals acquire a rv with probability ∼= 1. In the next
step, secrecy is then extracted from this common randomness
by means of a suitable identical operation performed at each
terminal on the acquired common randomness. When the
common randomness first acquired by the d terminals is
maximal, then the corresponding secret key has the best rate
CSK given by (1).
In this work, we consider four simple models for which
we illustrate the construction of appropriate strong secret or
private keys, which rely on suitable SW codes. The SW codes
of interest will rely on the following result concerning the
existence of “good” linear channel codes for a BSC.
Hereafter, a BSC with crossover probability p, 0 < p < 12 ,
will be denoted by BSC(p). Let hb(p) be the binary entropy
function.
Lemma 1 [6]: For each ε > 0, 0 < p < 12 , and for all n
sufficiently large, there exists a binary linear (n, n−m) code
for the BSC(p), where m < n[hb(p)+ε], such that the average
error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is less than
2−nη, for some η > 0.
III. MAIN RESULTS
MODEL 1: Let the terminals 1 and 2 observe, respectively, n
i.i.d. repetitions of the correlated rvs X1 and X2, where X1,
X2 are {0, 1}-valued rvs with joint probability mass function
(pmf)
PX1X2(x1, x2) =
1
2
(1− p)δx1x2 +
1
2
p (1− δx1x2), p <
1
2
,
(3)
with δ being the Kronecker delta function. These two terminals
wish to generate a strong SK of maximal rate.
The SK-capacity for this model is [9], [1], [5]
CSK = I(X1 ∧X2) = 1− hb(p) bit/symbol.
In the following, we show a simple scheme for both terminals
to generate a SK with rate close to 1−hb(p), which relies on
Wyner’s well-known method for SW data compression [13].
The SW problem of interest entails terminal 2 reconstructing
the observed sequence x1 at terminal 1 from the SW codeword
for x1 and its own observed sequence x2.
(i) SW data compression [13]: Let C be the linear (n, n−m)
code specified in Lemma 1 with parity check matrix P. Both
terminals know C and P.
Terminal 1 transmits the syndrome Pxt1 to terminal 2. The
maximum likelihood estimate of x1 at terminal 2 is:
xˆ2(1) = x2 ⊕ fP(Px
t
1 ⊕Px
t
2),
where fP(Pxt1 ⊕Pxt2) is the most likely n-sequence v with
syndrome Pvt = Pxt1 ⊕ Pxt2, with ⊕ denoting addition
modulo 2 and t denoting transposition.
The probability of decoding error at terminal 2 is given by
Pr(Xˆ2(1) 6= X1) = Pr(X2 ⊕ fP(PX
t
1 ⊕PX
t
2) 6= X1).
Under the given joint pmf (3), X2 can be considered as an
input to a virtual BSC(p), while X1 is the corresponding
output, i.e., we can write
X1 = X2 ⊕V,
where V = (V1, · · · , Vn) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued
rvs, independent of X2, with Pr(Vi = 1) = p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It
readily follows that
Pr(Xˆ2(1) 6= X1) = Pr(fP(PV
t) 6= V).
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 1 that for some η > 0,
Pr(Xˆ2(1) 6= X1) < 2
−nη,
for all n sufficiently large.
(ii) SK construction: Consider a (common) standard array for
C known to both terminals. Denote by ai,j the element of the
ith row and the jth column in the standard array, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−m.
Terminal 1 sets K1 = j1 if X1 equals ai,j1 in the standard
array. Terminal 2 sets K2 = j2 if Xˆ2(1) equals ai,j2 in the
same standard array.
(iii) SK criteria: The following theorem shows that K1 con-
stitutes a strongly achievable SK with rate approaching the
SK-capacity.
Theorem 1: The pair of rvs (K1,K2) generated above, with
(common) range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr(K1 6= K2) < 2
−nη;
I(K1 ∧ F) = 0;
H(K1) = log |K1|.
Further,
1
n
H(K1) > 1− hb(p)− ε.
Remark: The probability of K1 being different from K2
exactly equals the average error probability of maximum
likelihood decoding when C is used on a BSC(p). Furthermore,
the gap between the rate of the generated SK and the SK-
capacity is as wide as the gap between the rate of C and the
channel capacity. Therefore, if a “better” channel code for
a BSC(p), in the sense that the rate of this code is closer
to the channel capacity and the average error probability of
maximum likelihood decoding is smaller, is applied, then a
“better” SK can be generated at both terminals, in the sense
that the rate of this SK is closer to the SK-capacity and
the probability is smaller that the keys generated at different
terminals do not agree with each other.
MODEL 2: Let the terminals 1 and 2 observe, respectively, n
i.i.d. repetitions of the correlated rvs X1 and X2, where X1,
X2 are {0, 1}-valued rvs with joint pmf
PX1X2(0, 0) = (1− p)(1 − q),
PX1X2(0, 1) = pq,
PX1X2(1, 0) = p(1− q),
PX1X2(1, 1) = q(1− p),
where p < 12 and 0 < q < 1. These two terminals wish to
generate a strong SK of maximal rate.
Note that Model 1 is a special case of Model 2 for q = 12 .
We show below a scheme for both terminals to generate a SK
with rate close to the SK-capacity for this model [9], [1], [5],
which is
CSK = I(X1 ∧X2) = hb(p+ q − 2pq)− hb(p) bit/symbol.
(i) SW data compression: This step is identical to step (i) for
Model 1 .
(ii) SK construction: Suppose that both terminals know the
linear (n, n − m) code C specified in Lemma 1, and a
(common) standard array for C. Let {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m} denote
the set of coset leaders for all the cosets of C. Given a (generic)
{0, 1}-valued rv X , the set of sequences x ∈ {0, 1}n is called
X-typical with constant ξ, denoted by T nX,ξ, if
2−n[H(X)+ξ] ≤ PnX(x) ≤ 2
−n[H(X)−ξ].
Denote by Ai the set of T nX1,ξ-sequences in the coset of C
with coset leader ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m. If the number of sequences
of the same type (cf. [4]) in Ai is more than 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′],
where ε′ > ξ+ε, then collect arbitrarily 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′] such
sequences to compose a subset, which we call a regular subset
(as it consists of sequences of the same type). Continue this
procedure until the number of sequences of every type in Ai
is less than 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′]. Let Ni denote the number of
distinct regular subsets of Ai.
Enumerate (in any way) the sequences in each regular
subset. Let bi,j,k, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni,
1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
, denote the kth sequence of the
jth regular subset in the ith coset (i.e., the coset with coset
leader ei).
Terminal 1 sets K1 = k1 if X1 equals bi,j1,k1 .
Otherwise, K1 is set to be uniformly distributed on{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
}
, and independent of (X1,X2). Ter-
minal 2 sets K2 = k2 if Xˆ2(1) equals bi,j2,k2 . Otherwise, K2
is set to be uniformly distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
}
,
independent of (X1,X2,K1).
(iii) SK criteria: The following theorem shows that K1 con-
stitutes a strongly achievable SK with rate approaching the
SK-capacity.
Theorem 2: For some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0, the pair of
rvs (K1,K2) generated above, with range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr(K1 6= K2) < 2
−nη′ ;
I(K1 ∧ F) = 0;
H(K1) = log |K1|.
Further,
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2)− ε
′.
MODEL 3: Let the terminals 1, · · · , d observe, respectively, n
i.i.d. repetitions of {0, 1}-valued rvs X1, · · · , Xd which form
a Markov chain
X1 −◦−X2 −◦− · · · −◦−Xd,
with a joint pmf PX1···Xd given by: for 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1,
PXiXi+1(xi, xi+1) =
1
2
(1−pi)δxixi+1+
1
2
pi (1−δxixi+1), pi <
1
2
.
These d terminals wish to generate a strong SK of maximal
rate.
Note that Model 1 is a special case of Model 3 for d = 2.
Without any loss of generality, let
pj = max
1≤i≤d−1
pi.
Then, the SK-capacity for this model is [5]
CSK = I(Xj ∧Xj+1) = 1− hb(pj) bit/symbol.
We show below how to extract a SK with rate close to
1 − hb(pj) by using a SW data compression scheme for
reconstructing xj at all the terminals.
(i) SW data compression: Let C be the linear (n, n − m)
code specified in Lemma 1 for the BSC(pj), with parity check
matrix P. Terminals i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1, transmit the syndromes
Pxti , respectively.
Let xˆi(j) denote the maximum likelihood estimate at
terminal i of xj . For 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1, terminal i, with
the knowledge of (Pxti+1, · · · ,Pxtj , xi), forms the following
successive maximum likelihood estimates
xˆi(i+ 1) = xi ⊕ fP(Px
t
i ⊕Px
t
i+1),
xˆi(i+ 2) = xˆi(i+ 1)⊕ fP(Px
t
i+1 ⊕Px
t
i+2),
.
.
.
xˆi(j) = xˆi(j − 1)⊕ fP(Px
t
j−1 ⊕Px
t
j).
For j + 1 ≤ i ≤ d, terminal i, with the knowledge of
(Pxtj , · · · ,Pxti−1,xi), forms the following successive maxi-
mum likelihood estimates
xˆi(i− 1) = xi ⊕ fP(Px
t
i ⊕Px
t
i−1),
xˆi(i− 2) = xˆi(i− 1)⊕ fP(Px
t
i−1 ⊕Px
t
i−2),
.
.
.
xˆi(j) = xˆi(j + 1)⊕ fP(Px
t
j+1 ⊕Px
t
j).
It can be shown that for some η′ = η′(η, d) > 0,
Pr(Xˆi(j) = Xj , 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d) > 1− 2
−nη′ .
(ii) SK construction: Consider a (common) standard array for
C known to all the terminals. Denote by al,k the element of the
lth row and the kth column in the standard array, 1 ≤ l ≤ 2m,
1 ≤ k ≤ 2n−m.
Terminal j sets Kj = kj if Xj equals al,kj in the standard
array. Terminal i, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d, sets Ki = ki if Xˆi(j) equals
al,ki in the same standard array.
(iii) SK criteria: The following theorem shows that Kj con-
stitutes a strongly achievable SK with rate approaching the
SK-capacity.
Theorem 3: The set of rvs (K1, · · · ,Kd) generated above,
with range Kj (say), satisfy
Pr(K1 = · · · = Kd) > 1− 2
−nη′ ;
I(Kj ∧ F) = 0;
H(Kj) = log |Kj |.
Further,
1
n
H(Kj) > 1− hb(pj)− ε.
MODEL 4: Let the terminals 1, 2 and 3 observe, respectively,
n i.i.d. repetitions of the correlated rvs X1, X2, X3, where
X1, X2, X3 are {0, 1}-valued rvs with joint pmf
PX1X2X3(0, 0, 0) = PX1X2X3(0, 1, 1) =
(1− p)(1 − q)
2
,
PX1X2X3(0, 0, 1) = PX1X2X3(0, 1, 0) =
pq
2
,
PX1X2X3(1, 0, 0) = PX1X2X3(1, 1, 1) =
p(1− q)
2
,
PX1X2X3(1, 0, 1) = PX1X2X3(1, 1, 0) =
q(1− p)
2
,
where p < 12 and 0 < q < 1. Terminals 1 and 2 wish to
generate a strong PK of maximal rate, which is concealed
from the helper terminal 3.
Note that under the given joint pmf of X1, X2, X3, we can
write
X1 = X2 ⊕X3 ⊕V,
where V = (V1, · · · , Vn) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued
rvs, independent of (X2,X3), with Pr(Vi = 1) = p, 1 ≤ i ≤
n.
We show below a scheme for terminals 1 and 2 to generate
a PK with rate close to the PK-capacity for this model [1], [5]
CPK({1, 2}) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3)
= hb(p+ q − 2pq)− hb(p) bit/symbol.
The preliminary step of this scheme entails terminal 3 simply
revealing its observations x3 to both terminals 1 and 2.
Then, Wyner’s SW data compression scheme is used for
reconstructing x1 at terminal 2 from the SW codeword for
x1 and x2 ⊕ x3.
(i) SW data compression: This step is identical to step (i) for
Model 1.
(ii) PK construction: Suppose that terminals 1 and 2 know
the linear (n, n − m) code C specified in Lemma 1, and a
(common) standard array for C. Let {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m} denote
the set of coset leaders for all the cosets of C. Given (generic)
{0, 1}-valued rvs X , Y , the set of pairs of sequences (x,y) ∈
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}n is called XY -typical with constant ξ, denoted
by T nXY,ξ, if x ∈ T nX,ξ, y ∈ T nY,ξ, and
2−n[H(X,Y )+ξ] ≤ PnXY (x,y) ≤ 2
−n[H(X,Y )−ξ].
For every y ∈ {0, 1}n, the set of sequences x ∈ {0, 1}n is
called X |Y -typical with respect to y with constant ξ, denoted
by T n
X|Y,ξ(y), if (x,y) ∈ T
n
XY,ξ. Note that T nX|Y,ξ(y) is an
empty set if y 6∈ T nY,ξ.
For a sequence x3 ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by Ai(x3) the set of
T n
X1|X3,ξ
(x3)-sequences in the coset of C with coset leader ei,
1 ≤ i ≤ 2m. If the number of sequences of the same joint type
(cf. [4]) with x3 in Ai(x3) is more than 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′],
where ε′ > 2ξ + ε, then collect arbitrarily 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]
such sequences to compose a regular subset. Continue this
procedure until the number of sequences of every joint type
with x3 in Ai(x3) is less than 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
. Let Ni(x3)
denote the number of distinct regular subsets of Ai(x3).
For a given sequence x3, enumerate (in any way) the
sequences in each regular subset. Let bi,j,k(x3), where 1 ≤
i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni(x3), 1 ≤ k ≤ 2
n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
, denote
the kth sequence of the jth regular subset in the ith coset.
Terminal 1 sets K1 = k1 if X1 equals bi,j1,k1(X3).
Otherwise, K1 is set to be uniformly distributed on
{1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]}, independent of (X1,X2,X3).
Terminal 2 sets K2 = k2 if Xˆ2(1) equals bi,j2,k2(X3).
Otherwise, K2 is set to be uniformly distributed
on {1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]}, independent of
(X1,X2,X3,K1).
(iii) SK criteria: The following theorem shows that K1 con-
stitutes a strongly achievable PK with rate approaching the
PK-capacity.
Theorem 4: For some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0, the pair of
rvs (K1,K2) generated above, with range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr(K1 6= K2) < 2
−nη′ ;
I(K1 ∧X3,F) = 0;
H(K1) = log |K1|.
Further,
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3)− ε
′.
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